Amber Maimon, PhD

Neurotechnology & human–computer interaction researcher

Does Neuroplasticity Support the Hypothesis of Multiple Realizability?


Journal article


Amber Maimon, M. Hemmo
Philosophy of Science, vol. 89(1), 2022, pp. 107–127


Semantic Scholar DOI
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APA   Click to copy
Maimon, A., & Hemmo, M. (2022). Does Neuroplasticity Support the Hypothesis of Multiple Realizability? Philosophy of Science, 89(1), 107–127. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2021.16


Chicago/Turabian   Click to copy
Maimon, Amber, and M. Hemmo. “Does Neuroplasticity Support the Hypothesis of Multiple Realizability?” Philosophy of Science 89, no. 1 (2022): 107–127.


MLA   Click to copy
Maimon, Amber, and M. Hemmo. “Does Neuroplasticity Support the Hypothesis of Multiple Realizability?” Philosophy of Science, vol. 89, no. 1, 2022, pp. 107–27, doi:10.1017/psa.2021.16.


BibTeX   Click to copy

@article{amber2022a,
  title = {Does Neuroplasticity Support the Hypothesis of Multiple Realizability?},
  year = {2022},
  issue = {1},
  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
  pages = {107–127},
  volume = {89},
  doi = {10.1017/psa.2021.16},
  author = {Maimon, Amber and Hemmo, M.}
}

Abstract

Abstract It is commonly maintained that neuroplastic mechanisms in the brain provide empirical support for the hypothesis of multiple realizability. We show in various case studies that neuroplasticity stems from preexisting mechanisms and processes inherent in the neural (or biochemical) structure of the brain. We argue that not only does neuroplasticity fail to provide empirical evidence of multiple realization, its inability to do so strengthens the mind-body identity theory. Finally, we argue that a recently proposed identity theory called Flat Physicalism can be enlisted to explain the current state of the mind-body problem more adequately.




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